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FROM THE EDITOR:
We see ourselves as standing out in all ofhtstory as a people who cherisb and protect
freedom more than any other people. Our individual freedoms are insured through
our Bill of RIghts of our United Slates Constitullon and subsequent coostitutiOllal
amendmentS like !he 14th amendment with its due process and equal proteCtion
righlS, and through the Bill oj Righcs of our Kenmck} ConstitutIOn. December 15.
1992 is lhe 201sl Anniversary of the United Stales Bill oj Righls. September 28,
1992 is the 101st Armiversary of the KenlUcky ConslilUJion's Bill oj Rights.

SPECIAL RECOGNITION AND A LmERTY RESOURCE
1ltis very special issue of our magazine celebrateS !hese defming values, reminds us
of the historical reasons for the development of!hese precise individual protections,
and brings together rich resources and thinking for current and future use by
Kenmcky 's criminal justice system and by Kentucky's leaders and leachers. We
know of no current Kentucky resource of this magnilude which brings together so
much inforrruuion on our liberties. In addition [0 our regular criminal juslice readers.
this issue of our magazine goes to every Kentucky school, over 1,000. Hopefully, it
will be used for many years as a ready resource for our education system. Togelher,
we need to work 10 remind ourselves and to remind the future beneficiaries and
implementers of !he origin and imponance the guarantees of our fundamerual
freedoms.

WHE IS LmERTY MOST AT STAKE?
The raw power ojgovernmem vs. a person's libeny takes on ilS moSI dramatic baule
when the state. wough a prosecutor, seeks 10 imprison or kill a fellow citizen for
conduct claimed to be criminal. The extent to which that criminal process is fair is
the extent 10 which we really yalue libeny in our society.

WHO IMPLEMENTS OUR RIGHTS?
Rights on paper are meaningless. They must be put into effect by someone. A criminal
defense auomey or a public defender slands representing a citizen-accused against
lhe stale's desire 10 seize lhe liOOny or life of oneofits own. Defenders are the persOllS '
who implemem lheBill oj Rights, perhaps more than any other person in our SOCiety,
when !hey sland up and defend an individual against the power of govenunenl. Let's
recognize mis, appreciate it, and remind others of bow much we appreciate !hose
who are willing to slalld up for lhe poor, !he outcast, !he marginali7.ed, and even lhe
guilty and defenseless. The degree to which the state can take libeny from OIle of lhe
least of us is !he degree to which our real libeny is at risk. As Martin Luther King
has reminded us in his Leifer from Ihe Birmingham Jail, "Injustice anywhere is a
lbreal to justice everywhere." Sometime this year pal a Bill ojRights patriot on lhe
back and thank them for foslering our freedoms. The libeny we enjoy is a prodUCI
of !heir efforts.
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PRODUCED THROUGH MUCH GENEROSITY
This issue is publisbed through the enormous generosi ty of two donors: I) an
individual who prefers to remain anonymous, and who was attracted to donating
57.500 because of the special nature of this issue and its distribution to Kentucky's
schools: and 2) The Kentucky Bar Foundation which has given DPA a S2,800 grant.
The Kentucky Bar Foundation is cormniued to improving the adminisu-ation of
Justice. educating !he public aboutlhe legal s}>Stem and enhancing the image of the
profession. Its officers are: Carroll M. Redford, Jr., Presiden!; Robert W. Kel lcnnan,
President-Elect; William J. Kathman. Jr~ Vice President; Thomas E. Tumer, Secretary/freasurer; Carol M. Palmore, Immediate Past President. Jbe opinions ex pressed are !hose of !he aulhors, and do oot necessarily represent !he views of The
Bar Foundation or our anonymous donor. We are indebted to our donors for lheir
innnense generosity which will result in the education of many Kenmckians for the
ne~t generation on !he essential nature of our libeny.
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A SLEEPING GIANT: SECTION n OF
THE KENTUCKY BIll OF RIGHTS

CHAPTER 9

Allison ConneDy

Cons,titution of'Xf-ntucRy
Sectwn2:

.9lbso{ute ana arbitrary power over
fi~es, fiberty ana property offreemen
e~ts nowfiere in a repu6{ic, not even
in tfie fargest majority.

Dr. Thomas Clark concludes IIlat Kent ucky's firs t Constitution-that of
1792- was an "incongruous mixture of
fear, doubt, faith and hope. "T. Clark., A
History of Kentucky, 3195 (1960). This
description could easily apply to Section
2 of Kmmcky 's present Bill if Rights.
This section broadly proclaims:
Section 2: Absolute and Arbitrary
Power Denied. Absolute and arbilrary
JXlWer over !he lives, liberty and property of fn:e men exists nowhere in a
republic, not even in the largest majority.

The lristory of Ibis unique constirutional
proteCtion ag;Unst the exercise of arbitrary official power, reflects Kenmcky 's
own search for a political, economic and
social identity. Indeed, it is the ultimare
irony that Section 2, intended initially to
safeguard Ihe right of white males to hold
slaves, now embodies Kenmcky's due
process and equal protection guarantees.
Thus, while Section 2 was born from the
fear that slavery would be outlawed, and
from the doubt and mistrust that state and
local officials could nol safeguard the
rights of their citizens, il has grown into
a powerful tool thatlimilS arbitrariness in
the exercise of state power. Consequently, with faith and persistence in the
obligation of our state coons to correct
wrongs. this section contains the seeds of
hope for the future in ensuring a fair and
jusl criminal justice sysrelD.
Despite its sweeping language, IUltil recently this powerful section has largely
been ignored by criminal law practitioners. For example, while cases abowld
fmding oppressive governmental action
with respect 10 property rights, there is
only one criminal case that equates Section 2 with an accused's right to a fair
trial. Dean v. Commonweahh, Ky., m
S.W.2d 900 (1989) . Even Juslice
Stephens has nOIed, «While there are numerous cases which have been decided
on the basis of this bulwark of individual
liberty, the number is relative few, in
view of its potential importance to our
jurisprudence." Ke1tlUC/cy Milk Markel-

ing v. Kroger, Ky. 69 1 S.W.2d 893, 899
(1985). Oearly, it is time to wake Ibis
sleeping giant and use il to cbaIlenge
arbitrary practices by police officers,
prosecutors, judges. correctional officials and other state actors, who exercise
any power over the lives and libeny of
accused and convicted citizens. Accordingly, in this time of shrinIcing constirutiona! prolection 31 Ihe federal level, we
must rediscover our Stale constirution to
champion Ihe cause of life and libeny and
give il rnearting. Moreover, such an approach makes good legal and practical
sense. While the U.S. Constitution defines the minimum rights guaranteed an
individual, state constimtious may grant
more expansive constimtiona! prOteCtions to their citizens. Prun.eyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74,81
(1980). Indeed, as a threshold mauer,
KenlUcky courts must first determine the
valiclity of the law or action under the
Kenmcky Conslilution before resorting
to its federal counterpart. Fannin 11. Wi/Iiams, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 480 (1983).

What follows then is an overview of Section 2, it's IrislOry, purpose, scope and
application. It is hoped that by seeing
wbere the section has corne from, and
how it has been judicially interprered 10
reflect society's changing values, we will
be equipped to tap into its vast and 1llltested potential in the future.

L HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF
SECTION 2

The constitutional lristory of Section 2
has been shaped as much by historical
accident as judicial interpretations. Under Section 4 of the Kentucky'S ConsaIUtion, all supreme power rests with Ihe
people. Any power gi,!en to Ihe state is
expressly limited by Section 2. However,
in the early nineteenth century, "the pe0pie" only included white males over the
age of twenty one. Thus, the KenlUCky
Conslilution of 1849, the lhird constimtiona! Iry, designed Section 2 so that il
only applied to "free men." In fact, the
entire 1849 constimtion was built around
the protection of slavery. Consequent! y,

after slavery was abolished by the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the federal constitution. Kenmcky was forced to update and modernize its constimtion. For this reason,a final
constitutional COIlV ention was held in
1890. Still, Section 2 remained Ihe same.
As a result, il has been left to the courts
to intezpret Section 2 and give meaning
and effect to its expansive and beautiful
words.

II. THE MEANING OF SECTION

IWO

Christened the "great and essential princ iple of liberty and free government... which is indispensable to the happiness of an enlightened people, "Tierney

Coal Company v. Smilh' s Guardian, ISO
Ky. 815, 203 SW. 731,734 ( 1918). Section 2 is unique in American jurisprudence. Only Wyoming has a similar provision. Wyom. Const, Article L Sec. 7,
and that was borrowed from Kentucky.
However unique, il has been Ihe courts in
their expansive interpretation and defmition of "arbitrary," which has given the
section its true constirutional significance. As one coun observed:
[Slection 2 of OUI Constilution is simple, shan and expresses a view of governmental and political philosophy
that, in a very real sense, distinguishes
this republic frcm all other fOIIIlS of
government which place little or no
emphasis on the rights of individuals in
this society. Kentucky Milk Marketing,
supra, at 899.

Because of this view point, the courts
have painted with broad strokes the definition of arbitrary. In Sanitation District
No. 1 v. Cily of Louisville, Ky .• 213
S.W.2d 995, lOoo (1948), the court poeticallyexclaimed:
[W]h.atever is contrary to democratic
ideas, customs and maxims is arbitrary.
Likewise, whatever is essentially lJnjust and 1mequa1 or exceeds the reason-

able and legitimate interest of the pe0ple is arbitrary.

JUNE 1992 fFhe Advocate 114

JUNE 1992 {The Advoca1e 115

Moceover:
No bootdorof!1=vested with govcrnmerna' anthonty may ex ...cise ;1 am;lI'ariIy. If the action taken rests upon
reasons so unsubstantial or Ihe consequences are so IIlljust as to work a hardship, judicial power may be interposed
to prorect the rights of persons adversely effecied. Wells v. Board of
Educaliolt, Mercer Co., Ky., 289
S.w'2d 492, 494 (1956).
Although emotionally compelling, such
language IS not sunple legal rhetoric.
These words are the reasons for, and the
pIlilosop~y behind, Section 2. Ye!, criminal practitIOners have largely ignorod the
~~Ive legal powers of there ideals.
It IS illIJe to correct this neglect and began
to !eStth~ true parameter'S of Section 2the m:anmg of arbilnlry power over life
and I~bert}'---:m the representation of
those III the Cnminaljustioe system.

m. THE SCOPE OF SECTION
1WO

-was

Section ~
enacted as a safeguard to
the indivulual in ~t to his life, Iibeny, and property and has no connection
With Ihe appropriation of public funds "
Commonwealth v. Johnson, Ky ..,
S.w.2d 409.. 412 (1942). However, although Section 2 only proteclS individUals, 11 aclS as "a curb on the legislative as
well as ~n any other public body or public
officer m the assertion or anerripted exerC1Se of polillcal power." Sanitation District No.1 v. CiLy of Louisville, supra, at
1000. Thus. Section 2 broadly encompasses the arbl trary exelCise of power by
any '1loard or officer vested withgovemmenralanthority." Wells ~. BoardofEdu
c:mon. slIfJ.ra, at 494. Gearly then, Section 2 appltes to every SIa!e actor. ine/udmg any administrative agency or officer:
who a~ls pursuant to govemmemai
authonty _ Similarly, because of the
breadth of Section 2's langtia8e, theKenrucky Supreme Court has held it is the
functional equivalent of both federal due
process of law and equal prOfection of
law. Pmchell v. Marshall, Ky., 375
~.w.2d 253, 258 (l963). Yet, Section 2
IS eve~ broader than the 14th amendment.
A review of the decisions invoking Secnon 2 reveals it has been CO!lStrlled to
embody many of our most precious consu tullO?al rights. Statutes, ordinances,
regulau~ and administrative actions
have been lDvalidated under !his section
for overbreadth, Commonwealth v
Foley, Ky., 198 S.W.2d 941 (1990) f~
vagueness, City of Campbellsburg v

166

O~t,Ky. , 12 S.w.2d3t4(l903),f~

a denial of procedural due process including. the ri~ht of cross-examinati~ in
an admtnis!r3IIVe hearing Kaelin v CiLy
ofLouiswl!e, 643 S.W 2d 590 (1983)., on
substannve due process grounds, City of

Louisville v. KJ.lhn, 284 Ky., 684, 145
~.W 2d 851 (1940), and on equal prOlecIlon grounds City of Ashland v. Hecks
Ky. 401 S.w.2d 421 (1966).
•
Onfortunately, Section 2 has also been
used 10 tIlwarr fairness and justioe. Fa
example, Jt was held DOt to be an arbiirary
act by Ihe legis.Jatnre to prohibit inEegr3non of schools_Berea College v. CommoflHlealth, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W . 623
(1906). Likewise, in Mahan v. Bucha.nall(18), 221 S.W ~ 945 (1949), the
court cone/uded Section 2 was not violated when Mahan's parole was revoked
despite his acquittal on a subsequent
clIarge. Similarly, in Hines v. Commonwealth(l9), Ky. 357 S.W2d 843 (1962)
the counheld Seclion 2 was not infiinged
desplle the fact Hines had an airtight alibi
defense. ~es had .documenlliry evidence ~vmghe was m prisoo at Ihe time
o~ the cnme upon which he stood con~cted. !-foreover, his claims of ineffecDve asststance of counsel were ignOf'ed.
Still, while constitutional rights never
change, the scope of their application
expands or contraces 10 meet new and
changing OOIldiriOns. The wisdom and
~ecessitr of laws, regulations and prac~ces which, as applied to existing condib?US of the past, were routinely sustam~, now probably would be rejected
oumght as arbitrary and oppressive. We
IIJIlSI oonstaml y challenge th.e past with
new and creative solutions. Section 2 is
stagnant from disuse. We musl make it
on our own. We must define it and use it
to advance progress, so that its words
grOW, live and give meaning to our preCtOUS constirutional rights.

IV. APPUCATION OF SECTION
1WO.
In applying Section 2, the function of the
coun. is "10 decide a tesrofreguJariry and
le,gaIltyof [official] action ...by the consnruuona! protection against the exelCise
of arbitrary official power. KenlUCky
MiJkMarkeling, supra at 899. JUSt what
amounes 10 arbilnlry power is a judicial
quesuon. BrWllleT v. City of Danville,
Ky., 394 S.w.2d 939 (1965). Likewise,
the. question of reasonableness or amitrarmess of action "is one of degree and
muSt be based on the faclS of !he particular case. Boyles City Stockyard Company
V.Commonwealih,Ky.App.,510S.W.2d
?50 (1978). Thus, a legislative or admintStrabVe finding of fact is nO! conclusive
on the conn. U.s. Mining and Explora.
non Nanu~ Resources Company v. City
ofBeaflyVille, Ky~ 548 S.w2d833 835
(1977).
'

While all of these principles are common
to Secuon 2 analysis, because of the

b~Oad nmge of subjeces enCOlllpas.sed,
different rests have evolVed to determine
whetheraconstitulional violation has 0ccurred. For the IIlOiSt pan, these "teSts"
parrot their federal counterparts. However~ a brief review of the COurt's use of
Secllon 2 reveals !hat in many instances
the standards employed in its application
e less stnngem than the federal critenon.

a:

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS;
The guarantee of pmcedUTal fairness
which stems from both the 5th and 14th
amendments of the U. S. Constitution, is
also encompassed within Section 2 of the
Kenrucky Bill ofRig hIs . Turner v. Peters,
Ky., 327 S.W.2d 958 (1959). Consequ~y, Section 2 has been used 10 invalidate regulations. ordinances, SlaDlres
and even administrative actions. To invoke federal procedural due process., il
!;lUst .be shown tbat a deprivation of a
Significant life, libertyorpropeny interest bas occurred." Only then are the affected parties entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Fuellles 'II
Shevin., 407 U.S. 07, 79 (1912). On th~
. other band, Section 2 has no such re~ir~enes. Section 2 simply requires a
munmal sbowin~ that a party's life, liberty or property nght has been .affecled in
some manner by stale action. Kentucky
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Jacobs, ~y., 269 S.W2d 189 (1954). Indeed, m the final analysis, the ultimate
question of whether or not state procedural due process was granted revolves
around the question of arbitrariness.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. LouisVIlle, ere., Ky., 379 S.w.2d 450 456
(1964). Arbitrariness is so broadly de[moo that in this setting, it is simply
equated with "fairness." ld. Thus, if the
"state" acts oueside its statutory powers,
or did nor affo/l'l the party fair notioe OT a
farr OPPOrtuDJly 10 be heard, or if the
action taken is not supported by substantial evidence, it is arbilnlry. [d. For example. in Marcum v. Broughten. Ky
442 ~.W.2d 307 (1969),thecoungranted
a "'n t of habeas corpus to a prisoner
charged with capital murder. The conn
conclud~ that a successor judge had
acted arbltranly for revoking Marcum's
bail without any reason for Ihe revoca-

oon.

In shan, the opportunities to invoke Sec-

oon 2 on state procedural due process
grounds are enormous. Every unfair action by state officials can be cballenged
'f!1e fruits of Sl!ch defiance may lead to ~
Inal l?'pe. hearing 10 resolve disputes of
adjUdicanve facts. Kaelin v. City of Lou.
isville, KY 643 S.W 2d 590 (1983),

OVERBREADTH AND VOID

FOR VAGUENESS
Because of the broad reach of section 2,
the distinction lle:tween procedural and
substantive due process and the void for
vagueness and overbreadth docIrines has
been somewhat blurred by the Kenruclcy
appel.Iate courts. As such, Section 2 has
been n1i1ized to strike down statutes, ordinances and regulations that are overbroad or vague. Most recently, the KenOlcky Supreme Coon struck down the
J 988 election refonn stalllIe on Section 2
grounds. Commonwealth II. Foley, Ky.,
198 S.w.2d 941 (1990). The coun held
that the statute was facially IDlconstiOltiona! because it was vague and overbroad in !hat it prohibited constiOltionally
protected conduCE, and was susoeptible to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [d. at 951. In invoking Section 2,
the court noted the following:
The swute as written is so broad and
subject to such a vast may of interprelations thaI it mllSl fail on due process
and equal protection groonds. This stalute is an open invitaJion to arbitrary,
retaliatory, selective, rrivial, and therefore Wljus{ criminal pro=wion. ld,81
953.

Although the conn recognized a legitimare state interest in honest elections.lhe
coun invalidated the statute using Ihe
following test:
For a facial challenge on overhteadIh
grounds 10 prevail, real, subslaDlial and
basic conslirutionnghts must be at risk.
This Coon has deternIi:ned thai KRS

119.205 lacks minima! objeclive
guidelines for its application and therefore threa!ens !he constiru:tional rights
of all Kentucky cilizt:ns.ld.

Section 2 and Section II implicitly gwu-

aruee a defendant the right to a fair trial .
Dean v. Commonwealth, supra, at 905 .
FmalIy, there are no Section 2 caSes that
have used a strict scrutiny review for
deteImining whether fundamerual rights

owed the criminaJ defendant have been
abridged. Under federal due process
standards, a law that lOuches upon or
limits a fundamental right will be Slrictty
scrutinized, to insure that tbe law is necessary 10 promote a compelling or overriding iruerest of government. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 54 1 ( 1942).
Gearly, it is time to test the parameters
of Section 2 in this area. Certainly, Ihe
language of Section 2, its inclusive scope
and its definition of arbitrariness is broad
enough to eocompass a Slriet scrutiny
analysis of fundamental rights due individual citizens. We must push the coun
to reach this conclusion.

The federal courts have received a lot of
criticism for invalidating stalUteS on subslalltive due process grounds. lbat is because the U.S. Constillllion speaks only
of a procedure due an individual. Our
couns,however, bavenever been subject
to such criticism because the power 10
nullify legislative and quasi-legislative
acts is impliCit in Ihe language of Section
2_ Yet, decisions pertaining to criminal
law are woefully lacking in this area.
owhere does a Keruucky coun invoke
Section 2 to hold that cenain requirements are "implicit in a concept of ordered libetty," PalIw v. Corozec.ticul,302
U.S . 319 (1937), Of'!hat cenain rights are
"fuM. mental to the American scheme of
justice," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), or that convictionscarmotbe
brought about by methods that~ock the
conscieoce", Rochin v. California, 342
U.s. 165 (1952). Infact, oolyrecentlydid
the Kentucky Supreme Coun hold that

CONCLUSION
Section 2 is a sleeping giant with the
potential to change our world. We must
wake this bold giant and creative! y raise
i!, litigate its meaning and advocate zealously fories applica!ion. Only in this way,
can we hope 10 give it the conslimuonal
significance it so richly deserves.
ALLISON CONNELLY
Ollef, Post-Conviction Branch

FranJaon, Kenrucky 4060 1

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The philosophy behind the equal protection clause is !hat a government must treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. Thus, the equal protection clause
regulates the ability of government to
e/assify individuals fOT purposes of receiving governmental benefits or punishmen!. Although Section 2 has been used
as one part of Kenrucky's equal proteclion clause since 1947, see Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Comnwnwealth, Ky., 204 S.w.2d 973 (1947),
there was no analytical test established by
the court until 1978. In Standard Oil
Comparcy v. Boone Co. Board of Supervisors, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 83 (1978), the
coun resolved the issue of DIlcoostirutiona! discrimination under Section 2 by
holding:
[I]n order to invoke those fundamental

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

tection prong of Section 2, th.ere simply
are nor enough cases 10 determine Ihe
value Section 2 can play in the defense of
accused citizens. We musuaise and litigate these issues in <Ider to detennine the
boundaries Section 2 can p lay in the defense of individuals.

protections against the tmfair adminislrlllion of !he law !hat is not itself unconstiwtional, Ihe unequal treatrnenL
must amount [0 a conscious violation
of the principle of uniformilyJd. at 85.
In Hummeldorf v. Hummeldorf,
Ky.App., 616 S.W.2d 794 (1981) the
Coun of Appeals struck down thedivocoe
venue SllItII(e as uncoos tirutional for fu. ing venue in the home county of the wife.
The court held that the law irnpermissibly
disaiminated against men in violation of
both Section 2 and the Equal Protection
Gause of the 14th AmeTldment.In finding the starute arbitrary, the conn said the
statute was "unjust and anequal" and "exceeded the reasonable and legitimate interest of the people." ld. at 797. Once
again, the court has gifted us with language to use in the fuwre. By analyzing
our cases from a policy standpoint, ...-e
will be able 10 argue Section 2' s application. Then again, while there are more
criminal cases devoted to the equal pro-
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